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Executive Summary 
 In 2008, the Korean government launched a funding project that used formulas to select 
which four-year universities received funding from the government. The aim of the project was 
to improve university performance and educational quality, particularly with respect to 
undergraduate student outcome. However, there were few empirical studies on the project's 
actual impact. This study is an examination of three effects of the project. First, I analyze 
whether the project itself, regardless of funding, can bring about change in five formula 
indicators of all universities: employment rate, enrollment rate, full-time faculty rate, educational 
expenses per student, and scholarship rate. Second, in order to examine the effect of funding, I 
investigate the changes in the five formula indicators between funded universities and non-
funded universities. Third, I examine whether the project caused competition among universities 
and how universities responded to government policy.  
Recent studies in the U.S. have not provided empirical evidence that formula funding has 
increased the quality of universities, and many of these studies pointed out that the small 
percentage of funds tied to the achievement of these formulas may not be enough incentive for 
universities to make institutional changes. Observations used in this study are 149 of the 201 
public and private four-year universities in Korea. The dependent variables for this study are the 
five formula indicators.  
 The results of regression analysis show that formula funding in Korea was an effective 
policy to improve some performance and educational indicators from 2008 to 2011. However, 
the study also shows that the change in formula indicators of funded universities is lower 
compared to that of non-funded universities. Therefore, the results suggest that improving the 
performance of funded universities is a most urgent task.  
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1. Introduction 
The Korean Government launched the Educational Capacity Enhancement Project in 
2008. This approach to supporting funding for higher education institutions was new and 
represented a change from funding based on projects like human resources development to 
funding based on formulas used to evaluate each university's performance and educational 
quality. In order to select which universities will receive funding, the government assesses the 
best performing universities based on pre-determined formulas which include five indicators: 
graduate employment rate (hereafter “employment rate”), ratio of student enrollment as of total 
quota (hereafter “enrollment rate”), full-time faculty rate, educational expenses per student 
(hereafter “educational expenses”) and scholarship provision rates (hereafter “scholarship rate”)1. 
The government called the new funding method as formula funding2.  
The aim of the formula funding project was to improve university performance and 
educational quality (as demonstrated by the five formula indicators), particularly with respect to 
undergraduate student outcome and output. In addition, the project assumes that competing for 
funding makes universities improve their educational quality on their own volition. Moreover, 
the government provides block grants so that a funded university can have substantial discretion 
to identify problems, design programs, and allocate resources for upgrading its educational 
quality. As a result, the formula funding that the Korean Government designed can be classified 
as performance funding because the project ties outcome indicators to funding. The funding can 
also be classified as block grant funding because that universities received funding have 
1. The graduate employment rate and ratio of student enrollment as of total quota are proxy indicators for measuring 
university performance, and full-time faculty rate, educational expenses per student and scholarship provision rates 
are proxy indicators for university educational quality. 
2. The Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology in Korea added formula funding in an effort to improve the 
competitiveness of four-year higher education institutions. 
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flexibility to use the funds based on their own priorities (Ko, 2009). The total amount of grants 
based on formula funding increased from 64 billion won3 in 2008 to 240.6 billion won in 20114.  
In terms of accountability, the block grant fund or performance funding focuses on 
accountability for program goals and objectives rather than accountability for implementation 
and administrative process (GAO, 1995). Therefore stakeholders such as legislators, 
policymakers and auditors have paid more attention to the performances and outcomes of funded 
universities. More specifically, they have questioned whether the program can affect the 
university's performance and education quality. They also wanted to investigate whether the 
program led to organizational changes in higher education or not. However, there is little 
academic discussion about the effects of formula funding in Korea. Park (2010) examined the 
effects of the project from 2007 to 2008 and found that there was no difference in indicators 
between universities with funding and universities without funding. However, Baek (2009) 
argued that the project promoted differences between universities with high and low educational 
quality because the project did not support universities with low educational quality that needed 
government funding to improve educational quality, but did support universities with high 
educational quality that did not need funding.5  
The primary goal of this paper is to examine the impact of formula funding on 
universities performance and educational quality in Korea. Specifically, this study analyzes 
whether the project itself, regardless of funding, can bring about changes in the five formula 
indicators. Second, in order to examine the effects of funding, I investigate the differences in five 
formula indicators between universities with funding and universities without funding. Third, I 
3. The exchange rate is 1,074 won to USD$1on January 25, 2013.  
4. Revenue from formula funding averaged 3.1 billion won per university in 2011.The percentage of formula 
funding was about 24% of the total funding given by the Ministry of Education in 2010.   
5. http://monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?nNewsNumb=200908100054&ctcd=C&cpage=1 
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examine whether the project causes competition among universities and how universities 
respond to government policy.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 Funding formulas can be defined as “a means to allocate public funds for colleges and 
universities” (Lang, 2005, p.372). Although the terms “funding formulas” and “performance 
funding formulas” are used interchangeably in recent government policies for higher education, 
they have different meanings. Lang (2005) classified performance formulas into four types: 
enrollment-based formulas, staff-based formulas, composite formulas, and incentive or 
performance formulas. Lang explained that “incentive or performance formulas are unique in 
that they recognize outputs” (p.379). In general, performance funding uses “a clearly specified 
formula to tie funding to institutional performance on indicators such as student retention, 
attainment of certain credit levels, and other student outcomes” (Dougherty and Reddy, 2011, p.1). 
 There is little empirical literature on the impact of performance funding in higher 
education in the U.S. because most studies on performance funding programs focused on policy 
adoption and abandonment (Sanford and Hunter, 2011). Nevertheless, several researchers have 
examined the empirically impacts of performance funding programs in the U.S. Unfortunately, 
these recent studies did not provide evidence that performance funding led to increases in the 
quality of institutional performance. Many pointed out that the small percentage of funds 
(usually around 5%) tied to performance funding may not be enough incentive for universities to 
make institutional changes (Sin, 2010; Sanford & Hunter, 2011; Petrides, McClelland, & Nodine 
2004). Shin (2010) investigated whether state performance-based policy causes changes in two 
institutional performance indicators: graduation rates and levels of federal research funding. By 
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using Hierarchical Linear Modeling growth analysis and the data from 1997 to 2007, he found 
that states that adopted performance-based accountability did not see a noticeable increase in 
institutional performance and suggested that the ineffectiveness of performance funding may be 
a result of not including support for systems that are necessary to bring about the targeted 
changes.  
 Sanford and Hunter (2011) examined the impact of changes in Tennessee’s performance 
funding policies on retention and six-year graduation rates at public four-year institutions 
compared to other public universities from 1995 to 2009. They utilized spline linear-mixed 
models because these can analyze within-group change and between-group change 
simultaneously and account for between-group differences by incorporating fixed and random 
effects. They also found that tying retention and graduation rates to performance funding did not 
result in improvements. Furthermore, doubling the monetary incentive associated with the 
retention and six-year graduation rate measures in 2005 was not associated with increases in 
retention rates. The authors suggested that performance funding in Tennessee was ineffective 
because it did not provide enough incentive for universities to change. 
 Because of the short history of performance funding in higher education in Korea, there 
have been few studies of it. Ko (2009) pointed out that there were some differences in 
performance funding programs between the U.S. and South Korea. Specifically, state 
governments in U.S. used formulas to allocate funding for public higher education, whereas the 
central government in Korea employed formulas to select public and private universities that the 
government would support. This means that the Korean government provided funding for all 
types of universities (including private universities) to improve educational quality. Park (2010) 
examined whether the project had influenced universities’ educational performance and 
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educational quality in the first year. Utilizing Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV), he found 
no evidence that universities with funding had better outcomes than universities without funding 
in three out of four formula indicators. The exception was educational expense per student. The 
author cautions that the results have the limitation that one year is not enough time to judge 
whether the program worked. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 Many researchers use organizational theory to understand higher education change in 
response to government policy (Shin, 2010; Sanford & Hunter, 2011). Resource dependency 
perspective of organizational theory explains that organizations are inescapably bound to the 
conditions within their environment (Sanford & Hunter 2011, p. 7).  
 In light of this perspective, this study assumes that public and private universities in 
Korea would try to improve their educational formula indicators such as graduate employment 
and enrollment to obtain funding from the government because they are heavily dependent on 
government subsidies. Moreover, if a university cannot receive the funding, its reputation could 
deteriorate because failure to get the funding is made known to the public and people would view 
such a university as having poor educational performance and quality compared to its their peers. 
 This study also adopts the view that a university has a production function that becomes 
flatter as the amount of input increases, indicating diminishing marginal product: holding the 
amount of capital fixed, the marginal product of a unit decreases as the amount of the unit 
increases. Using the economic concept of diminishing marginal product, Park (2010) assumed 
that if universities invest the same input to improve educational quality, the increase for 
educational quality of universities with high indicators is lower than that of universities with low 
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indicators because of the law of diminishing returns. That is because the starting point for the 
educational production function between a university with funding and a university without 
funding is different: a university with funding has a high input point because it has high 
indicators and is limited in how much it can increase in educational quality, whereas a university 
without funding has a low input point on the same production curve due to its low indicators and 
therefore has an advantage for increasing educational quality with the same resources.   
 
4. Research Design 
4. 1. Data and variables 
 Data 
 Most of the data used in this analysis were collected from the Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology (MEST) in South Korea. Additional data were collected from the 
“Higher Education in Korea” website6. 
 Observations used in this study are for Korean public and private four-year universities. 
According to statistics provided by MEST, there were 201 four-year higher education institutions 
in Korea in 2012. In order to retain comparability, I selected 149 institutions from among the 
2017. As shown Table 1, 65 universities among 149 four-year universities in Korea were funded 
by the government to improve their educational quality in 2008. The number of universities 
funded by the government has fluctuated from year to year.  
6. “The Higher Education in KOREA” website allows the user to search for information about all universities in 
Korea in an easier and more convenient way according to the provisions of “the Act on Information Disclosure of 
Educational institutions” ( http://www.academyinfo.go.kr). 
7. The excluded 52 institutions included 10 teacher universities and 11 religious colleges that the government 
restricted from applying for the project in 2008, three branch campuses, and universities for which no data could be 
collected. 
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Table 1: Subject of Study 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Amount of funding 
(billion won) 
49.6 263.7 258.7 240.6 
Universities with 
funding 
65 82 79 72 
Universities without 
funding 
84 67 70 77 
Total 149 149 149 149 
 
Dependent variables 
 The dependent variables for this study are five indicators: employment rate, enrollment 
rate, full-time faculty rate, educational expenses per student, and scholarship rate (see Table 2). 
These indicators are the measures that the government uses to evaluate the results of the project. 
The goals of formula funding are to support universities that try to offer high-quality education 
and to encourage universities to train their students in order to meet the demands of business and 
society. The government selected employment rate and enrollment rate as proxy indicators for 
the extent to which universities meet the demands of business and society and selected the rate of 
full-time faculty, educational expenses, and scholarship rate as proxies for the teaching or 
educational quality of the universities. These proxies are also popular in the United States and 
other countries. In order to measure the effect of the funding and competition among universities, 
I created two variables: improvement and competition. The improvement variables are used to 
gauge how much each university has annually improved in the five indicators. The competition 
variables are employed to measure the effect of competition among universities by gauging how 
much each university has increased in the three indicators8 from 2007 through 2011.  
 
8. The variables used in this study are enrollment rate, education expenses, and scholarship rate I was unable to 
collect data on employment rate and full-time faculty rate in 2011.  
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Table 2: Variables 
Variable Description 
Control and 
explanatory 
variables 
 
 
 
Private university -dummy: If the observed university is “private university”, it is 
recorded as “1” and if the observed university is “public”, it is 
recorded as “0”. 
Seoul metro -dummy: If observation is located in Seoul Metropolitan Region, it is 
recorded as 1, and if observation is located in other region, it is 
recorded as "0". 
Size of the 
university's 
enrollment 
Group 1 - If a university has more than 10,000 students, it is recorded as "1" in 
the dummy of Group 1. 
- If a university has between 5,000 and 10,000 students, it is recorded 
as "1" in the dummy of Group 2. 
- If a university has less than 5,000 students, it is recorded as "1" in 
the dummy of Group 3. 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Funded - dummy: If a university is selected to be funded, it is recorded as 
"1", and if a university is not selected, it is recorded as "0". 
Funded*Group1 - Funded*Group 1 
Funded*Group2 - Funded*Group 2 
Funded*Seoul metro - Funded*Seoul metro 
Year dummies 
 
- The project has been implemented since 2008, so observations 
between 2008 and 2011 are recorded as "1" and observations 
measured in 2007 are recorded as "0" in this dummy.  
Funded group1 - If a university has received funding four times since 2008, it is 
recorded in 2011 as "1" in the dummy of Funded group1.  
Funded group2 - If a university has received funding one to three times since 2008, it 
is recorded in 2011 as "1" in the dummy of Funded group2. 
Funded group3 - If a university has never received funding since 2008, is recorded in 
2011 as "0" in the dummy of Funded group3 
Dependent 
Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employment rate (in %) - The graduate employment rate 
Enrollment rate (in %) - Ratio of student enrollment as of total quota 
Full-time faculty rate (in %) - Full-time faculty rate 
Educational expenses 
(in 1000won) 
-Educational expenses per student 
Scholarship rate (in %) -Scholarship provision rate 
Change of employment rate - The difference in annual change of the employment rate 
Change of enrollment rate - The difference in annual change of the enrollment rate 
Change of full-time faculty 
rate 
- The difference in annual change of full-time faculty rate 
Change of educational 
expenses 
- The difference in annual change of educational expenses 
Change of scholarship rate - The difference in annual change of scholarship rate 
Difference in enrollment 
rate 
- The difference in enrollment rate between 2007 and 2011 
Difference in educational 
expenses 
- The difference in educational expenses between 2007and 2011 
Difference in scholarship 
rate 
- The difference in scholarship rate between 2007 and 2011 
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Control and explanatory variables 
 The control variables used in this study are (a) private university, (b) Seoul metro region, 
and (c) size of the university’s enrollment. Park and Hong (2009) empirically analyzed the 
relationship between the educational performance of universities and the institution type, 
physical location, and size. They found that public universities, universities located in the Seoul 
metropolitan region and universities with an enrollment above 10,000 students perform better 
educationally than other universities. Koshal and Koshal (1999) also estimated that economies of 
scale existed in producing undergraduate and graduate student output and research activities. 
 The explanatory variables in this study are (a) year variable, (b) funded variable, and (c) 
funded group variable. First, the project assumes that competing for funding makes universities 
improve their educational quality. In other words, even universities that were not funded tried to 
enhance their educational indicators to receive funding the following year. To do this comparison, 
I use the year dummies in the regression analysis in order to indicate whether the project is 
implemented in that year. Year dummies from 2008 to 2011 mean that the formula funding 
project is implemented, which are using as an indicator of the project implementation. Second, in 
order to measure differences in the indicators between universities with funding and universities 
without funding, I created the Funded variable, which is also a dummy. Finally, in order to 
measure the degree of competition among funded universities, I made a group of variables called 
Funded Group which is divided into three groups by the number of times receiving funding: 
Funded group1 contains universities that received funding four times since 2008 and have the 
highest educational indicators among the universities. Funded group2 contains universities that 
received funding one to three times since 2008 and which are trying to catch up with Funded 
group1 to obtain steady funding. Funded group3 never received funding because of their low 
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educational indicators but are trying to improve their educational indicators to catch up with 
Funded group 1. It also is expected that the size of enrollment and the location of universities 
may have an impact on the change of formula indicators of funded universities. Thus, I made the 
Funded*Group1, Funded*Group2, and Funded*Seoul metro variables in order to measure the 
interaction effect between the Funded variable and other dummy variables. 
4. 2. Methodology and Research Model  
 The primary aim of this study is to examine the impact of the project and funding on the 
five formula indicators at four-year higher education institutions. To do so, I compiled panel-data 
over five years9 and pooled all the observations in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
However, there are some problems in pooling data. Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
occur often in the pooled data. To control for these possibilities, I used the Least Squares 
Dummy Variables (LSDV) method, which includes a series of dummy variables for individual 
years (Jaccard& Wan, 1993) and robust standard errors to examine the results precisely10. 
This study addresses the following research questions: 
 Research question 1: Did the universities show improvement in the five formula 
 indicators over the five years since the project was implemented in 2008?  
 Hypothesis 1: If the project is implemented, universities' performance and educational 
 quality will increase. 
 Model 1: 
Equation 1-1: Yemployment, t = β0 + β1Xprivate, t+ β2Xseoul, t+ β3Xgroup_1, t+ β4Xgroup_2,t+ β5X2008 + β6X2009 + 
9. The dependent variables were collected from 2007 to 2011. However, funded variables were collected over four 
year (from 2008 to 2011) because the project was implemented in 2008. 
 
10. I ran Breusch-Pagna/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity using Stata. The results showed that some 
regression model in this study had heteroskedasticity. Thus, I used robust standard errors.  
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β7X2010 + β8X2011t + µt 
Equation 1-2: Yenrollment, t = β0 + β1Xprivate, t+ β2Xseoul, t+ β3Xgroup_1, t+ β4Xgroup_2, t+ β5X2008 + β6X2009 + 
β7X2010 + β8X2011t + µt 
Equation 1-3: Yfaculty, t = β0 + β1Xprivate, t+ β2Xseoul, t+ β3Xgroup_1, t+ β4Xgroup_2, t+ β5X2008 + β6X2009 + β7X2010 
+ β8X2011t + µt 
Equation 1-4: Yexpense , t = β0 + β1Xprivate, t+ β2Xseoul, t+ β3Xgroup_1, t+ β4Xgroup_2,t+ β5X2008 + β6X2009 + 
β7X2010 + β8X2011t + µt 
Equation 1-5: Yscholarship, t = β0 + β1Xprivate, t+ β2Xseoul, t+ β3Xgroup_1,t+ β4Xgroup_2,t+ β5X2008 + β6X2009 + 
β7X2010 + β8X2011t + µt 
Where Y employment, t is the employment rate at university i recorded in year t. Y enrollment, t is the enrollment 
rate at university i recorded in year t. Yfaculty, t is the full-time faculty rate at university irecorded in year t. 
Y expense, t is the educational expense per student at university i recorded in year t. Y scholarship, t is the 
scholarship rate at university i recorded in year t. X private is the private university. X seoul is Seoul metro 
region. X group_1 is the group 1 which is universities with an enrollment above 10,000 students. Xgroup_2 is 
the group 2 which is university with an enrollment between 5,000 and 10,000 students. X 2008~2011 
represents the Year dummies, the variable of interest in this analysis. µ denotes the random error in the 
model. 
 
Research question 2: Is there a difference in change of formula indicators between 
universities with funding and universities without funding, controlling for other factors?  
Hypothesis 2: If a university is funded, it is more likely to improve its performance and 
educational quality. 
Model 2: 
Equation 2-1: ΔY employment, t = β0 + β1Xprivate, t + β2Xseoul, t + β3Xgroup_1, t + β4Xgroup_2,t + β5Xfunded,t + 
β6Xfun_G1,t + β7Xfun_G2,t + β8Xfun_Se,t + µt 
Equation 2-2: ΔY enrollment, t = β0 + β1Xprivate, t + β2Xseoul, t + β3Xgroup_1, t + β4Xgroup_2, t + β5Xfunded,t +  
β6Xfun_G1,t + β7Xfun_G2,t + β8Xfun_Se,t + µt 
Equation 2-3: ΔY faculty, t = β0 + β1Xprivate, t + β2Xseoul, t + β3Xgroup_1, t + β4Xgroup_2, t + β5Xfunded,t +  
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β6Xfun_G1,t + β7Xfun_G2,t + β8Xfun_Se,t + µt 
Equation 2-4: ΔY expense , t = β0 + β1Xprivate, t + β2Xseoul, t + β3Xgroup_1, t + β4Xgroup_2,t + β5Xfunded,t +  
β6Xfun_G1,t + β7Xfun_G2,t + β8Xfun_Se,t + µt 
Equation 2-5: ΔY scholarship, t = β0 + β1Xprivate, t + β2Xseoul, t + β3Xgroup_1,t + β4Xgroup_2,t + β5Xfunded,t +  
β6Xfun_G1,t + β7Xfun_G2,t + β8Xfun_Se,t + µt 
where ΔY employment, t is the change in the employment rate at university i recorded in year t, ΔY enrollment, t is 
the change in the enrollment rate at university i recorded in year t, ΔY faculty, t is the change in the full-time 
faculty rate at university i recorded in year t, ΔY expense , t is the change in the educational expense per 
student at university i recorded in year t, ΔY scholarship, t is the change in the scholarship rate at university i 
recorded in year t. X private, t, X seoul, t, Xgroup_1, t, and Xgroup_2,tt represent all the same variables as in Equation 
1. X funded represents Funded (the variable of interest in this analysis), X fun_G1 is the Funded*Group1 at 
university i recorded in year t, X fun_G2 is the Funded*Group2 at university i recorded in year t, X fun_Se is 
the Funded*Seoul metro at university i recorded in year t, and µ denotes the random error in the model. 
 
Research question 3: Is there is a difference in the change of formula indicators between 
funded group 1 and funded group 2 or funded group 3, controlling for other factors? 
Hypothesis 3: If the project is implemented, funded group 2 and funded group 3 are more 
likely to improve their performance and educational quality than funded group 1 do. 
Model 3: 
Equation 3-1: ΔY enrollment, 2007~2011 = β0 + β1Xprivate, 2011 + β2Xseoul, 2011 + β3Xfunded_group_2, 2011 + 
β4Xfunded_group_3, 2011 + µt 
Equation 3-2: ΔY expense, 2007~2011 = β0 + β1Xprivate, 2011 + β2Xseou, 2011 + β3Xfunded_group_2, 2011 + 
β4Xfunded_group_3, 2011 + µt 
Equation 3-3: ΔY scholarship, 2007~2011 = β0 + β1Xprivate, 2011 + β2Xseoul, 2011 + β3Xfunded_group_2, 2011 + 
β4Xfunded_group_3, 2011 + µt 
 
where ΔY enrollment, 2007~2011 is the change in the enrollment rate at university i between 2011 and 2007, ΔY 
educational , 2007~2011 is the change in the educational expense per student at university i between 2011 and 
2007, and ΔY scholarship, 2007~2011isthe change in the scholarship rate at university i between 2011 and 2007. 
Xprivate, 2011 and X seoul, 2011 represent all the same variables as in Equation 1. X funded_group2 and X funded_group3 
15 
 
represent the Funded group (the variable of interest in this analysis), and µ denotes the random error in 
the model. 
 
5. Analysis and Findings 
 The analyses and results are presented and discussed by research question. 
5. 1. Program Effects: Research Question 1 
 As shown in Figure 1, all indicators in 2011 except scholarship rate increased compared 
to those in 2007 (i.e., before the project was implemented). The growth of educational expenses 
was especially higher than that of other indicators. 
  
<Growth of 4 indicators (%)>                             <Growth of education expense (1000won)> 
Figure 1: Growth of five formula indicators (2007~2011) 
 
 Table 3 presents the LSDV regression results of the analyses of the impact of the project 
on the five formula indicators during the years 2008 to 2011 compared to university indicators in 
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2007 (i.e., before the project was implemented). 
Table 3: Least Squares Dummy Variables Regression Results for the effect of the project on 
five formula indicators 
 Estimated Coefficients 
(t-Statistics) 
Variables Employment 
rate 
Enrollment 
rate 
Full time faculty 
rate 
Educational 
expenses 
Scholarship 
rate 
Private -0.32 
(-0.31) 
-7.43*** 
(-11.82) 
-10.07*** 
(-7.46) 
-1197.63** 
(-2.22) 
-3.20*** 
(-5.78) 
Seoul Metropolitan 
region 
-0.75 
(-0.74) 
12.91*** 
(21.19) 
4.23*** 
(3.34) 
2420.11*** 
(3.08) 
-0.53 
(-0.74) 
Group 1 -3.85*** 
(-2.89) 
13.68*** 
(13.44) 
-6.35*** 
(-3.54) 
-2227.05* 
(-1.69) 
-5.46*** 
(-3.99) 
Group 2 -2.91*** 
(-2.15) 
5.77*** 
(5.58) 
-7.46*** 
(-4.12) 
-4227.87*** 
(-3.24) 
-7.04*** 
(-5.07) 
2008 Year 0.19 
(0.14) 
1.88 
(1.57) 
2.64 
(1.62) 
-410.65 
(-0.52) 
-0.67 
(-0.44) 
2009 Year -19.13*** 
(-14.75) 
0.96 
(0.84) 
3.76** 
(2.31) 
493.21 
(0.58) 
-1.39 
(-1.01) 
2010 Year 0.38 
(0.32) 
2.62** 
(2.31) 
4.19*** 
(2.63) 
976.69 
(0.14) 
-1.18 
(-1.02) 
2011 Year N/A 5.74*** 
(5.09) 
N/A 5078.67*** 
(2.88) 
-0.69 
(-0.59) 
Observation 585 712 587 712 712 
Intercept 63.27*** 
(37.16) 
92.43*** 
(63.3) 
69.72*** 
(32.70) 
11501.89*** 
(10.01) 
25.82*** 
(16.12) 
F-value 53.94 91.93 11.42 7.08 14.94 
R-squared 0.37 0.52 0.11 0.06 0.06 
Note: Employment rate and full-time faculty rate are analyzed until 2010 because of missing data in 2011. 
*p < 0.10, **p <0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
 First, the formula funding project did not have a statistically significant effect on 
employment rate in 2008 and 2010, its effect was only statistically significant in 2009. Even 
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though the project was statistically negative and significant on the employment rate in 2009, 
there were several things we have to consider. In 2009, the government changed the method of 
collecting data. Previous to this time, universities collected the number of employed graduates   
and reported this number to the government. This became a problem because universities would 
calculate their employment rate falsely in order to raise their employment rate. In order to 
address this problem, the government calculated each university’s employment rate by using   
the data from the National Health Insurance Service. In Korea, all workers employed in an 
organization have to join the National Health Insurance Service by law. Thus, employment data 
collected by the National Health Insurance Service were used to calculate employment rate 
starting in 2009. As a result, the employment rate decreased in 2009 by a large amount compared 
to 2007 and 2008. The decrease of employment rate may also have been caused or affected by 
the increase of the overall unemployment rate because of the 2008 financial crisis. Youth 
unemployment remained at 7% between 2007 and 2008 but it increased by 1.1% (from 7% to 
8.1%) in 2009. Therefore, I assume that the temporary situation influenced the decrease of 
employment rate in 2009. This result suggests that the project may not have affected the   
growth of employment rates. 
 Second, the formula funding project did have a statistically significant effect on 
enrollment rate in 2010 and 2011. Moreover, the amount of growth of enrollment rate was bigger 
over time and its statistical significance (p-value) was stronger over time. This result showed that 
the project might bring about the growth of a university’s enrollment rate. However, the growth 
of enrollment rate in 2008~2009 was not statistically significant. The financial crisis in 2008 and 
the burden of higher education costs may have had a negative effect on the enrollment rate.   
 Third, compared to 2007, the full-time faculty rate increased by 3.76% (from 58.49% to 
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62.09%) in 2009 and by 4.19% (from 58.49% to 62.5%) in 2010. This change is statistically 
significant since 2009 and suggests that the project had a positive effect on improving the 
university’s full-time faculty rate. Growth of the full-time faculty rate in 2008 may not have been 
statistically significant because universities might have been having difficulty in recruiting 
qualified staff in a short time after the project was implemented. 
 Fourth, growth of educational expenses was only statistically significant in 2011. This 
result shows that that the project had a positive effect on improving the university’s educational 
expenses since 2011. 
 Finally, the growth of scholarship rate was not statistically significant in any year since 
2008. However, it is too early to draw a conclusion that there was no effect of the project on   
scholarship rate over the period studied because this effect might correlate only with a funded 
university. In addition, the effect of the project on employment rate, enrollment rate, full-time 
faculty rate, and educational expenses also may change between a university with funding and a 
university without funding.  
 
5. 2. Funding Effects: Research Question 2 
 Table 4 presents the results of analyzing the difference in change of five formula 
indicators between universities with funding and universities without funding. 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
Table 4: Least Squares Dummy Variables Regression results for effects of the funding on 
five formula indicators 
 Estimated Coefficients 
(t-Statistics) 
 Change of 
Employment 
rate 
Change of 
Enrollment rate 
Change of Full 
time faculty 
rate 
Change of Education 
expenses per 
students(1000won ) 
Change of 
Scholarship 
rate 
Private -3.73*** 
(-3.84) 
-0.74 
(-1.65) 
0.36 
(0.63) 
-131.37 
(-0.23) 
0.11 
(0.16) 
Seoul 
Metropolitan 
region 
1.57 
(1.47) 
-1.66*** 
(-3.09) 
-1.29*** 
(-2.77) 
300.20 
(1.59) 
0.49 
(1.63) 
Group 1 1.10 
(0.85) 
-1.88** 
(-2.37) 
-0.33 
(-0.59) 
5.38 
(0.02) 
0.38 
(0.83) 
Group 2 0.13 
(0.1) 
-2.41*** 
(-3.20) 
0.32 
(0.55) 
-199.30 
(-0.76) 
0.25 
(0.55) 
Funded -3.32 
(-1.43) 
-5.39*** 
(-4.71) 
-1.80 
(-1.1) 
1923.56** 
(0.91) 
-1.59 
(-0.79) 
Funded*Group1 1.32 
(0.59) 
3.66*** 
(3.27) 
0.88 
(0.62) 
-1271.45 
(-0.77) 
0.98 
(0.59) 
Funded*Group2 1.61 
(0.69) 
4.14*** 
(3.65) 
0.55 
(0.38) 
-1729.05 
(-1.00) 
1.10 
(0.64) 
Funded*Seoul -0.78 
(-0.52) 
2.89*** 
(4.02) 
2.40*** 
(2.73) 
565.72 
(0.68) 
0.51 
(0.61) 
2009 year -20.28*** 
(-21.74) 
-2.63*** 
(-4.43) 
-1.41*** 
(-2.58) 
1110.69*** 
(4.85) 
-0.04 
(-0.06) 
2010 year 19.06*** 
(27.14) 
-0.04 
(-0.10) 
-1.88*** 
(-3.90) 
724.34*** 
(3.49) 
0.85 
(1.08) 
2011 year N/A 0.48 
(1.05) 
N/A 3873.71*** 
(3.89) 
0.72 
(1.25) 
Observation 435 560 438 560 560 
Intercept 3.63** 
(2.53) 
5.22*** 
(5.47) 
2.98*** 
(3.90) 
-782.86 
(-1.11) 
-0.91 
(-0.96) 
F-value 178.24 7.66 4.60 7.19 1.44 
R-squared 0.82 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.02 
Note. Employment rate and full-time faculty rate are not available for 2011. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
 The regression shows that there was no statistically significant difference in the change 
of employment rate between universities with funding and universities without funding from 
2008 to 2010. There was also no statistical significance on the interaction effects. Why did 
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funded universities not try harder to improve their employment rate than non-funded universities 
even though they received funding from the government? Funded universities had a higher 
employment rate than non-funded universities in 2008 (see Table 5). If there was diminishing 
marginal product in improving the educational indicator and universities with funding had higher 
employment rates than their peers at the beginning of the project, it was more difficult for funded 
universities to improve in this indicator (Park, 2010). As shown in Figure 2, the increase of 17.6% 
in the employment rate of funded universities may be relatively lower than the increase of 21.6% 
for universities without funding in 2010 compared to 2007 because funded universities had a 
higher employment rate to start with in 2008 (see Table 5). Funded universities might have 
chosen to invest elsewhere. Nevertheless, the result does not support that if a university is funded, 
it is more likely to improve its employment rate. 
 
Figure 2: Mean growth of change of employment rate between funded universities and non- 
funded universities (2008~2010) 
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Table 5: Difference in Mean of employment rate between universities with Funding and 
universities without funding 
Year 2008 2009 2010 
Employment 
Rate 
Funded 64.36 45.26 63.51 
Non-funded 57.59 35.88 57.37 
Difference 6.77 9.38 6.14 
 
 The regression results for the impact of funding on the university’s enrollment rate show 
that there was a statistically significant difference in the change of enrollment rate between 
universities with funding and universities without funding but the change was lower for 
universities with funding. This may be the result of a gap in enrollment rates between 
universities with funding and universities without funding at the beginning of the project. As 
shown in Table 6, the funding might not have been an incentive for the funded universities to 
improve the enrollment rate because they already had an indicator above 100%. However, the 
funding might have been an incentive for the non-funded universities without funding to improve 
the enrollment rate because they had an indicator below 100%. 
 
Table 6: Difference in Mean of enrollment rate between funded universities and non-
funded universities 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Enrollment 
Rate 
Funded 106.90 103.94 106.15 108.82 
Non-funded 94.76 93.18 94.93 99.42 
Difference 12.14 10.76 11.22 9.40 
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Figure 3: Mean growth of change of enrollment rate between funded universities and non-funded 
universities (2008~2011) 
 
 In addition, there was a statistically significant interaction effect between the Funded 
variable and the Group1 or Group2 or Seoul metro variables. In other words, the funding might 
have different effects on the change of enrollment rate of funded universities according to the 
size of enrollment and the location. The coefficients of Funded*Group1, Funded*Group2, and 
Funded*Group3 are -3.61%, -3.66%, and -5.39%. In other words, the funding had a stronger 
impact on the change of enrollment rate for funded universities which had a large enrollment 
than for funded universities which had a small enrollment. The coefficients of Funded*Seoul 
metro and Funded*Other region are -4.16% and -5.39%. That is, funding had a stronger impact 
on the change of enrollment rate of funded universities located in the Seoul metropolitan than 
that of funded universities located in other regions. These results do not support that if a 
university is funded, it is more likely to improve its enrollment rate. 
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requirements that the funding cannot be used for payroll costs did not provide universities with 
motivation to upgrade their full-time faculty rate. In other words, even though a university is 
funded by the government, employing full-time faculty may not a rational choice for universities 
because doing so can raise labor costs in the long run. As seen in Figure 4, the mean growth of 
change of full-time faculty rate of funded universities decreased from 2008 to 2010. In addition, 
there was a statistically significant interaction effect between the Funded variable and the Seoul 
metro variable. The coefficient of Funded*Seoul metro is -0.69% and the coefficient of 
Funded*Other region is -1.8%. The result shows that funding had a larger impact on the change 
of full-time faculty rates of funded universities located in the Seoul metropolitan area compared 
to other regions. These results do not support that if a university is funded, it is more likely to 
improve its full-time faculty rate. 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean growth of change of full-time faculty rate between funded universities and non- 
funded universities (2008~2010) 
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factor indicating whether a university was selected for funding by the government. As seen in 
Table 7 and Figure 5, the amount of educational expenses of universities with funding was two 
times bigger than that of their peers.  
 
 
Figure 5: Mean growth of change of educational expenses between funded universities and non- 
funded universities (2008~2011) 
 
Table 7: Difference in Mean of educational expenses between universities with Funding and 
universities without funding 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Educational 
Expenses 
(1,000won) 
Funded 11204.06 11442.17 12402.33 17731.11 
No funded 6800.29 7239.38 7320.47 9486.40 
Difference 4403.77 4202.79 5081.86 8244.71 
 
 What factors caused the difference in educational expenses between funded universities 
and non-funded universities? Funding might be a major factor in the increase of educational 
expenses in the universities with funding because it was counted as educational expenses. As 
shown in Table 8, funded universities received an average of 439,410 won per student from the 
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educational expenses. 
 
Table 8: The amount of the funding per students in universities with funding(2011) 
 Mean Max Min The number of 
University 
The amount of 
funding per 
students 
(1,000won) 
439.41 1,858.17 80.06 72 
  
 The difference in the change of scholarship rate between universities with funding and 
universities without funding was not statistically significant and there was also no statistically 
significant interaction effect. Figure 6 shows that universities without funding spent more money 
in improving the scholarship rate than their peers over the period studied. However, as shown in 
Table 9, universities with funding had a scholarship rate of 22.81% in 2008; this was 8.65% 
higher compared to universities without funding. Thus, universities with funding might spend 
more money in improving other indicators such as educational expenses rather than spend money 
in improving their scholarship rate. As a result, the result does not support that if a university is 
funded, it is more likely to improve its scholarship rate. 
 
Figure 6: Mean growth of change of scholarship rate between funded universities and non-
funded universities (2008~2011) 
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Table 9: Difference in Mean of Scholarship rate between universities with Funding and 
universities without funding 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Scholarship 
Rate 
Funded 22.81 19.36 19.43 18.74 
Non-funded  14.16 14.38 14.91 16.46 
Difference 8.65 4.98 4.52 2.28 
 
5. 3. Competition Effects: Research Question 3 
 The government assumed that universities would try to improve their educational 
formula indicators to obtain funding because they are heavily dependent on government 
subsidies. So, I assume that Funded group2, which is subject to funding based on the change of 
indicators, and Funded group3, which never received funding, would try to catch up with the 
change of the educational indicators shown by Funded group1 which received funding four times. 
If there is no difference in the change of indicators between Funded group1 and Funded group2 
or Funded group3, I can assume that the project has a competition effect by making universities 
compete with their peers. The analyses are discussed by group because the government selected a 
university to receive funding based on the size of its enrollment. 
 Group 1 
 Group1 includes universities which have more than 10,000 students. Table 10 shows 
descriptive statistics on the change in the three indicators among funded groups in Group111. The 
average enrollment rate of all funded groups in 2011 had increased compared to the mean in 
2007. Funded group2 had a change of enrollment rate of 5.9%, Funded group1 had a change of 
enrollment rate of 5.22, and Funded group3 had a change of enrollment rate of 2.98.  
 
11. The variables studied in this research question are enrollment rate, education expenses, and scholarship rate 
because these three indicators had complete data during the period of 2007 to 2011. 
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics on change of indicators among Funded Groups in Group1 
Variable Observation Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Difference in 
enrollment rate 
  
  
Funded Group1 24 5.22 4.53 -2.96 15.24 
Funded Group2 13 5.90 6.05 -1.36 17.44 
Funded Group3 9 2.98 2.41 -0.62 6.61 
Difference in 
educational expenses 
  
  
Funded Group1 24 7539.05 7617.66 3102.03 37356.36 
Funded Group2 13 3065.59 2515.05 -356.40 9441.62 
Funded Group3 9 1967.39 639.99 814.88 2577.89 
Difference in  
scholarship rate 
  
  
Funded Group1 24 -1.06 3.35 -7.14 5.57 
Funded Group2 13 0.41 2.97 -4.56 5.99 
Funded Group3 9 1.0 1.34 -0.69 3.41 
 
 As shown in Table 11, the regression shows that the difference in the change of 
enrollment between Funded group2 and Funded group1 was not statistically significant. 
However, the difference in the change of enrollment between Funded group3 and Funded group1 
was statistically significant and negative. Therefore, we can assume that Funded group 2 did try 
to catch up with the change of enrollment rate of Funded group1 but Funded group3 failed. 
  
Table 11: Ordinary Least Squares Regression results for effects of competition among 
funded groups(Group 1) 
Group 1 
Estimated Coefficients 
(t-Statistics) 
Difference in  
Enrollment rate 
Difference in Educational 
expenses (1000won) 
Difference in Scholarship 
rate 
Private 0.72 
(0.28) 
-2664.50 
(-0.74) 
0.51 
(0.49) 
Seoul Metropolitan 
region 
-0.09 
(-0.06) 
5050.199** 
(1.95) 
2.66*** 
(3.64) 
Funded group2 0.40 
(0.17) 
-3084.90** 
(-2.3) 
1.49 
(1.48) 
Funded group3 -2.56* 
(-1.74) 
-4841.42*** 
(-3.39) 
1.63* 
(1.87) 
Observation 46 46 46 
Intercept 4.87** 
(2.67) 
6667.65*** 
(3.24) 
-2.56*** 
(-2.92) 
F-value 1.40 3.84 6.39 
R-squared 0.05 0.31 0.30 
* p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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 As seen in Table 10, the education expenses per student of all Funded groups had a 
positive change between 2007 and 2011. In particular, the educational expenses of Funded 
group1 increased more than two times compared to Funded group2 and more than three times 
compared to Funded group3. The regression shows that the difference in the change of 
educational expenses between Funded group2 or Funded group3 and Funded goup1 was 
statistically significant. As I discussed, the funding had a big effect on the change of educational 
expenses of universities with funding. Thus, Funded group2 and Funded group3 could not try to 
catch up with the change of education expenses of Funded group1. This result suggests that 
Funded group2 and Funded group3 did not in fact try to catch up with the change of educational 
expenses of Funded group1. 
 As seen in Table 10, the scholarship rate of Funded group 2 and Funded group3 had a 
positive change but Funded group1 had a negative change of scholarship rate between 2007 and 
2011. The regression shows that the difference in the change of scholarship rate between Funded 
group2 and Funded group1 was not statistically significant. The difference in the change of 
scholarship rate between Funded group3 and Funded group1 was statistically significant but the 
difference was positive. Therefore, the result suggests that Funded group2 and Funded group3 
did try to catch up with the change of scholarship rate of Funded group1.  
 
 Group 2 
 Group2 includes universities that have between 5,000 and 10,000 students. Table 12 
presents descriptive statistics on the change in the three indicators among Funded groups in 
group2. The average enrollment rate of all Funded groups in 2011 increased compared to the 
mean enrollment rate in 2007. However, the enrollment rate of Funded group1 had an increase of 
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6.61%, which was two times more than Funded group2 and six times more than Funded group3.  
Table 12: Descriptive statistics on change of indicators among Funded Groups in Group2 
Variable Observation Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Difference in 
enrollment rate 
  
  
Funded Group1 19 6.61 6.91 -1.24 20.05 
Funded Group2 14 1.11 7.54 -19.47 8.68 
Funded Group3 16 3.13 3.99 -5.36 9.42 
Difference in 
educational expenses 
  
  
Funded Group1 19 3816.02 3397.15 -573.79 11858.29 
Funded Group2 14 1779.86 997.51 743.14 4112.91 
Funded Group3 16 1519.27 807.09 267.23 3390.37 
Difference in  
scholarship rate 
  
  
Funded Group1 19 -2.08 2.69 -6.83 2.59 
Funded Group2 14 0.43 2.30 -3.21 3.94 
Funded Group3 16 0.48 2.57 -3.28 7.32 
 
 As seen in Table 13, the regression shows that the difference in the change of enrollment 
rate between Funded group2 or Funded group3 and Funded group1 was statistically significant. 
Therefore, the regression suggests that Funded group2 and Funded group3 did not try to catch up 
with the change of enrollment rate of Funded group1. 
Table 13: Ordinary Least Squares Regression results for competition effects among 
funded groups (Group 2) 
Group 2 
Estimated Coefficients 
(t-Statistics) 
Difference in  
Enrollment rate 
Difference in Educational 
expenses(1000won) 
Difference in Scholarship 
rate 
Private -0.78 
(0.29) 
1464.92* 
(1.28) 
1.05 
(1.05) 
Seoul Metropolitan 
region 
-0.10 
(-0.05) 
852.57 
(1.26) 
1.69** 
(2.17) 
Funded group2 -5.83** 
(-2.35) 
-2516.05** 
(-2.29) 
2.33** 
(2.37) 
Funded group3 -3.95* 
(-1.70) 
-3387.43** 
(-2.45) 
1.57 
(1.51) 
Observation 49 49 49 
Intercept 6.35*** 
(3.25) 
2962.20*** 
(5.95) 
-3.09*** 
(-4.37) 
F-value 1.52 2.72 4.50 
R-squared 0.12 0.29 0.32 
* p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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 As seen in Table 12, educational expenses of funded group1increased more than two 
times compared to those of Funded group2 and Funded group3. The regression shows that the 
difference in the change of educational expenses between Funded group 2 or Funded group3 and 
Funded goup1 was statistically significant. This result suggests that Funded group2 and Funded 
group3 did not try to catch up with the change of educational expenses of Funded group1. 
 As seen in Table 12, the scholarship rate of Funded group2 and funded group3 had a 
positive change but Funded group1 had a negative change of scholarship rate between 2007 and 
2011. As seen in Table 13, the regression shows that the difference in the change of scholarship 
rate between Funded group2 and Funded group1 was statistically significant and positive. The 
difference in the change of scholarship rate between funded group3 and funded group1 was not 
statistically significant. These results suggest that Funded group2 and Funded group3 did try to 
catch up with the change of scholarship rate of Funded group1. 
 Group 3 
 Group3 includes universities which have less than 5,000 students. As seen in Table 14, 
Funded group2 and Funded group3 increased their enrollment rate by 12.68% and 10.74% 
respectively in 2011 compared to the rate in 2007. However, the change of enrollment rate of 
Funded group1 decreased by 0.01% between 2007 and 2011. Thus, as seen in Table 15, the 
regression shows that the difference in the change of enrollment rate between Funded group2 and 
Funded group1 was statistically significant and positive, but the difference in the change of 
enrollment rate between Funded group3 and Funded group1 was not statistically significant. The 
regression suggests that Funded group2 and Funded group3 did try to catch up with the change 
of enrollment rate of Funded group1.  
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Table 14: Descriptive statistics on change of indicators among Funded Groups in Group3 
Variable Observation Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Difference in 
enrollment rate 
  
  
Funded Group1 11 -0.01 6.77 -11.19 7.30 
Funded Group2 9 12.68 9.63 -0.28 29.76 
Funded Group3 10 10.74 17.49 -10.70 47.68 
Difference in 
educational expenses 
  
  
Funded Group1 11 16588.97 36600.41 -11488.50 119012.30 
Funded Group2 9 514.44 6225.42 -12748.52 11964.47 
Funded Group3 10 969.67 1413.17 -1209.01 3421.49 
Difference in  
scholarship rate 
  
  
Funded Group1 11 -8.53 21.65 -72.01 5.72 
Funded Group2 9 -3.96 8.67 -20.47 4.09 
Funded Group3 10 -2.29 4.06 -7.94 4.57 
 
 As seen in Table 14, the educational expenses of all Funded groups had a positive 
increase. The regression shows that the difference in the change of educational expenses between 
Funded group2 or Funded group3 and Funded group1 was not statistically significant. Therefore, 
the regression suggests that Funded group2 and Funded group3 did try to catch up with the 
change of educational expenses of Funded group1. 
 Finally, the regression shows that the difference in the change of scholarship rate 
between Funded group2 or Funded group3 and Funded group1 was not statistically significant. It 
seems like there was a competition among Funded groups in Group3. However, as seen in Table 
14, the scholarship rate of all Funded groups in Group3 decreased between 2007 and 2011. That 
means that universities in Group3 did not try to improve their scholarship rate. As a result, there 
was no effect of competition among Funded groups in Group3 to improve scholarship rate. 
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Table 15: Ordinary Least Squares Regression results for competition effects among 
Funded groups (Group 3) 
Group 3 
Estimated Coefficients 
(t-Statistics) 
Difference in 
Enrollment rate 
Difference in Educational 
expenses(1000won) 
Difference in 
Scholarship rate 
Private 1.81 
(0.42) 
5943.25 
(0.51) 
-0.42 
(-0.06) 
Seoul Metropolitan 
region 
-1.78 
(-0.46) 
-1227.84 
(-0.12) 
9.54 
(1.69) 
Funded group2 12.31*** 
(3.04) 
-16668.39 
(-1.25) 
5.95 
(0.74) 
Funded group3 9.95 
(1.61) 
-17023.59 
(-1.14) 
8.83 
(1.01) 
Observation 30 30 30 
Intercept -0.84 
(-0.21) 
12172.79 
(1.19) 
-11.65* 
(-1.84) 
F-value 3.35 1.00 1.06 
R-squared 0.20 0.11 0.11 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
6. Policy Implications and Conclusion 
 This study examined: (a) the impact of the project on five indicators, (b) the impact of 
the funding on five indicators, and (c) institutional change to improve educational indicators. The 
results of the analysis are summarized in Table 16, and the conclusions are presented below.  
Table 16: Summary of Results 
 Employment 
rate 
Enrollment 
rate 
Full-time 
faculty rate 
Educational 
expenses 
Scholarship 
rate 
Program Effect No Yes Yes Yes No 
Funding Effect No No No Yes No 
Competition 
Effect 
Group 1 N/A Yes N/A No Yes 
Group 2 N/A No N/A No Yes 
Group 3 N/A Yes N/A Yes No 
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The project itself might have an effect on improving some educational qualities in all 
universities.  
 The project may have brought about the growth of enrollment rate, full-time faculty rate, 
and educational expenses over the five years since the project was implemented in 2008. 
However, there was no evidence that the project had any effect on the growth of employment 
rate and scholarship rate.  
The funding might not affect improving formula indicators of funded universities compared to 
non-funded universities.  
 The findings of this study show that there was no difference in the change of the 
indicators except for educational expenses between universities with funding and universities 
without funding from 2008 to 2011. Why do funded universities seem to have lower performance 
and educational indicators? Many studies in the U.S pointed out that a low percentage of funds 
(usually around 5% or 6%) is tied to performance funding (Petrides, McClelland, &Nodine 2004; 
Sin, 2010; Sanford & Hunter, 2011). Shin (2010) used the resource dependence perspective of 
organization theory to explain what this might result in:  
Universities selectively and strategically respond to demands impacting their survival and 
growth. If the financial incentives linked with institutional performance are attractive, 
universities might incorporate the new accountability into their internal systems. 
Otherwise, universities might not be motivated to change. (pp. 63-64)  
However, resource dependence perspective is not enough to explain the situation of the project in 
Korea. Reputation may also play a part. Failure to get funding is public knowledge that may 
threaten the university’s reputation in that the public may think such a university has poor 
educational quality. To prevent their reputations from deteriorating, non-funded universities may 
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have tried harder to improve their indicators. Therefore, a follow-up study on the project needs to 
focus on the impact of the percentage of the funding in a funded university on institutional 
changes. Despite the monetary incentives, if a funded university is not more likely to improve its 
performance and educational quality compared to its peers, it will be difficult for the government 
to continue to support the performance funding project. 
The project makes universities compete with their peers.  
The project has a competition effect of making universities compete with their peer 
university. For example, Funded group2, which is subject to funding depending on the change of 
indicators, and Funded group3, which never received funding, did try to catch up with the change 
of indicators of Funded group1 which received funding four times. The findings of this study 
suggest that formula funding in Korea has been an effective policy to improve some performance 
and educational indicators. 
The government needs to consider replacing some indicators.  
The project did not affect the change of employment rate and scholarship rate. In 
particular, some researchers pointed out that the employment rate indicator was not under the 
control of the universities because job placement rates were dependent on the state of the local 
economy, which varies over time and by region (Banta et al., 1996; Bell, 2005; Dougherty & 
Hong, 2006; Dougherty and Reddy, 2011). However, this study could not find a reason why 
some universities did not raise their scholarship rate. The impact of the project on scholarship 
rate needs additional study.  
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Appendix  
Table A-1: Youth Unemployment rate(15~29 years old) 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Unemployment 
Rate 
7.2 7.2 8.1 8.0 7.6 
* source: http://www.index..go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/potal/stts/po_STTS_IdxMain.jsp? idx_cd=1063 
 
Table A-2: Descriptive Statistics: Growth of 5 educational indicators(2007-2011) 
Variable Year N Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Employment rate 
2007 148 60.33 11.95 20.9 90.7 
2008 149 60.54 12.89 5.2 92.29 
2009 145 41.18 10.41 10.73 68.84 
2010 143 60.67 8.19 28.87 84.29 
Enrollment rate 
2007 149 98.17 14.63 41.2 145.3 
2008 149 100.05 13.34 52.99 128.21 
2009 146 99.22 12.53 54.23 127.72 
2010 143 100.97 12.14 59.87 128.27 
2011 125 104.68 11.26 66.41 129.97 
Full-time Faculty rate 
2007 149 58.34 14.55 28.6 131.3 
2008 149 60.98 15.25 29.73 127.27 
2009 146 62.09 14.77 29.21 140.62 
2010 143 62.5 14.13 35.2 147.05 
Education Expense 
per students  
2007 149 9132.05 7001.59 4294 69017 
2008 149 8721.4 6815.32 1855.47 64954.02 
2009 146 9599.85 7766.29 4092.21 72906.34 
2010 143 10056.86 7852.6 5100.36 68640.59 
2011 125 14103.44 1847.05 6209.86 188029.3 
Scholarship rate 
2007 149 18.6 11.82 6.3 115.3 
2008 149 17.93 14.97 4.79 162.26 
2009 146 17.17 12.53 7.42 133.11 
2010 143 17.34 8.43 7.72 89.2 
2011 125 17.73 8.11 8.01 86.02 
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Table A-3: Descriptive Statistics: Change of 5 indicators of funded universities and no 
funded universities (2008-2011) 
 
Variable Observation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Funded 
Change of employment 
rate 
224 -0.94339 17.32647 -65.476 28.682 
Change of enrollment rate 294 0.563772 4.307307 -28.9 14.33 
Change of full-time 
faculty rate 
224 1.180746 5.218788 -42.927 33.538 
Change of educational 
expense 
294 1569.084 7653.813 -16431.4 120965 
Change of scholarship rate 294 -0.60797 7.080639 -79.599 46.966 
Non 
funded 
Change of employment 
rate 
211 0.774839 18.28643 -43.366 54.721 
Change of enrollment rate 266 1.813703 4.665115 -20.598 24.329 
Change of full-time 
faculty rate 
214 1.863472 3.436197 -15.714 12.858 
Change of educational 
expense 
266 329.9928 1344.761 -3053.56 13446.55 
Change of scholarship rate 266 -0.06039 2.792961 -9.065 16.849 
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